This paper is an operational case study of the Korean War that focuses on the United Nations Command (UNC) offensive of 1950. This study examines the requirement to balance operational functions in war by looking at the operational maneuvers of this campaign and contrasting these maneuvers against considerations of other operational functional areas as characterized by the national and theater-strategic situation prevailing at the time. The review of this case will provide lessons; fairly simple and sometimes obvious, yet also vital and timeless that will prove useful in considering the problems of future military operations. This case study will evaluate operational maneuver against the operational functions of fires, protection, logistics, intelligence, and command and control. The analysis will be conducted in the context of the medium of space, time and forces involved. Further, it will consider the interaction between these factors and the levels of war, an especially interesting comparison because of the compression and crossover effects of tactical and operational events. These lessons will offer valuable teaching points that military professionals can use as they plan and execute future military operations or campaigns.
The proximate cause for the failure of the UNC offensive of 1950 was the imbalance and ineffective linkage between critical operational functions and the maneuver offensive conducted into North Korea in the fall of 1950. The root of this failed linkage is attributable to the inability of General MacArthur to balance national and theater strategic objectives while commanding field forces at the operational level.
The United Nations Command (UNC) offensive in 1950 during the Korean War provides an example of brilliant operational maneuver followed by strategic disaster. A review of this case will yield lessons, perhaps obvious, but still vital and timeless. This study makes these cases: 1) that strategic and operational objectives often do not reinforce one another, 2) spectacular operational maneuver does not ensure strategic success, 3) accomplishing the strategic end state is reliant on proper structure, organization and chain of command, 4) operational intelligence can only be effective if it fuses strategic and tactical intelligence, and, 5) carefully consider the results expected from operational fires and structure them to deliver operational effects.
This case study will evaluate operational maneuver against the operational functions of fires, protection, logistics, intelligence, and command and control. The analysis will be conducted in the context of the medium of space, time and forces involved. Further, it will consider the interaction between these factors and the levels of war, an especially interesting comparison because of the compression and crossover effects of tactical and operational events. These lessons will offer valuable teaching points that military professionals can use as they plan and execute future military operations or campaigns.
The principle cause for the failure of the UNC offensive of 1950 was the imbalance and ineffective linkage between critical operational functions and the maneuver offensive conducted into North Korea in the fall of 1950. The root of this failed linkage is attributable to the inability of General MacArthur to balance national and theater strategic objectives while commanding field forces at the operational level. As the U. S. Marine Corps history of the war concluded: "It is a lesson of history that questions of how to use a victory can be as difficult as problems of how to win one." General MacArthur had to achieve to end the war on favorable terms, the destruction of NKPA forces and the isolation of the North Korean border to deter and prevent Chinese or Soviet intervention.
The implementation of this reorientation of forces caused consternation among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and within both Eighth Army and X Corps.
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The withdrawal of the X Corps elements from combat north of Seoul and their retrograde to Inchon in preparation for the Wonsan assault even under the best of circumstances was bound to cause a loss of UNC combat power in the P'yongyang drive. However, the extent of the disruption and its effect on operations in the Eighth Army were beyond those anticipated. Nonetheless, the UNC continued to enjoy tactical success during October. Indeed, by the time X Corps went ashore at Wonsan, both the major tactical events that its assault was intended to support had been accomplished by the pre-existing major force dispositions.
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In the west the Eighth Army, under General Walton
Walker, began its attack on P'yongyang on 9 October. The North Korean capitol fell to UNC forces on 20 October without the benefit of any support of X Corps, and despite the adverse effects of the X Corps redeployment. In the east, the I ROK Corps preempted the X Corps Division of X Corps.
With the entire UN offensive thrown into reverse, forward elements of the X Corps were forced to withdraw nearly sixty miles southward through precipitous mountain trails to the coast through masses of enemy infantry….Because of the massiveness of the Chinese attack, General MacArthur directed the commanders of the X Corps and the UN naval and air forces to co-ordinate in effecting the evacuation of the X Corps… General MacArthur decided to transfer the X Corps to South Korea where its strength could be used to reinforce the Eighth Army in opposing the next Chinese offensive of the winter campaign.
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The There are understandable practical, human, political, and military reasons that support the expansion of the missions assigned to General MacArthur.
The timing of the decisions supporting the expansion of the UNC mission was critical since they preceded slightly, or followed closely in the wake of, the stunning success of the Inchon operation. The feeling of the times was opportunism. Accordingly there was significant military, political, and diplomatic support for General MacArthur's expansive views. To harness the advantage this afforded him, while mitigating the risk of third party intervention, General MacArthur had to move with decisive force in a rapid manner. He sought to destroy the NKPA so as to establish conditions for the transition to a democratically elected government in a unified state of Korea. The accomplishment of this task in the fastest manner possible would have the added benefit of discouraging intervention by third party belligerents. In the end there was clearly a strategic failure in assessing the risks of third party intervention, but the fact remains that speed of action was required to secure the best military conditions.
Space. To achieve the objectives he had been assigned,
General MacArthur was anxious to project military forces throughout
North Korea to a depth and breath that would accomplish the disruption of NKPA activities, and secure vital industrial, social, cultural, and political locations. This power projection would have prevented major force concentrations by the defeated NKPA forces while facilitating the transition of civil control to occupation forces. Given the disruption of the NKPA because of the scope of the defeats suffered during Inchon and the subsequent breakout operations, the UNC had the opportunity to consolidate authority over these areas with reasonable risks (for a moment ignoring the intelligence failures regarding the ultimately decisive intervention by PLA forces).
Pursuit and exploitation operations were used to accomplish rapid attacks in depth. General MacArthur is criticized in hindsight because of his decision to divide his forces in the face of the enemy by pulling X Corps from the P'yongyang front and deploying them to the east coast at Wonsan. Certainly there are valid elements in this criticism.
However, to be fair, the decision needs to be reviewed in the light of the context of the time and from the perspective of the theater strategic level of war. When General MacArthur pulled X Corps out of the lines to operate against the eastern coastal area, the NKPA was largely defeated. Indeed the fact that the Eighth Army was able to conduct a successful offensive against the P'yongyang front in the absence of the X Corps suggests that there may have been a force imbalance in the west. There were longer-term logistical benefits associated with forces realigned and balanced between the east and west coasts. The promise of opening the eastern ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Iwon, which presumably suffered less damage than those of Inchon and Chinnamp'o through P'yongyang, must have been attractive to planners. Keeping two major forces operating independently on opposite coasts afforded a degree of redundancy and security in theater. Reducing reliance on the port at Inchon with its notorious tides also must have been an attractive option. Finally, eastern ports were closer to Japanese ports and afforded easier access for shipping than the western and some southern ports that UNC had been using up to this point.
Another factor supporting General MacArthur's maintenance of separate commands is the preparation for war termination. General
MacArthur is reported to have planned on utilizing X Corps as occupation forces headquarters with General Almond as the Commander.
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After Inchon, his concerns for post war security of Korea were prudent and go far in explaining an otherwise cumbersome command structure.
Lesson 2. Over-reliance on operational maneuver to achieve the strategic results envisioned by the UNC Commander, absent balancing input from the operational functional areas of intelligence and logistics, set the stage for strategic failure.
All things considered, in the fall of 1950 the UNC was in a perfect position to execute classic exploitation and pursuit operations to secure the fruits of victory. Exploitation and pursuit missions, by their very nature, focus heavily on mobility and freedom of maneuver.
General MacArthur and General Almond held the widely shared belief that the supremacy of maneuver provided the key to victory. While other leaders in the Joint Staff, Eighth Army and X Corps were concerned with the near reckless disposition of forces during the fall offensive, for General MacArthur and General Almond the desire to rapidly seize and occupy terrain was paramount.
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Understanding the strategic context and General MacArthur's predisposition for a war of maneuver, it is still difficult to understand how he could have so completely failed to incorporate consideration of intelligence and logistics, and to a lesser degree fires and command and control into his plan. According to General
Ridgway, While MacArthur's intense eagerness to complete his mission with dispatch is understandable, it is difficult to justify his plan and orders in the face of all that was known about the enemy's strength, his own supply situation, the terrain, and the manner in which his own command was dispersed --even had they been adequately equipped and at full strength, which was far from the case. Repositioning X Corps resulted in an operational pause for the UNC, despite initially favorable unit dispositions that could have allowed the Corps to continue the attack on P'yongyang from its west coast location. This repositioning cost the UNC the initiative and had repercussions in the Eighth Army. The logistical challenges that brought about the operational pause were self-inflicted and are directly attributable to the decision to pursue an east coast amphibious assault at Wonsan. 20 The Eighth Army advance into North Korea had begun under great logistical difficulties and was supported only by the narrowest margin….The unfavorable supply situation largely grew out of the fact that during the first half of October (1 -17 October) unloading activities at Inch'on for Eighth Army were negligible. Practically all the port capabilities at that time were engaged in mounting out the 1 st Marine Division for the Wonsan operation. Levels of some supplies for I Corps were at times reduced to only one day, and only selective unloading enabled the supply sections to meet troop requirements. Most combat vehicles, such as tanks, operated in the forward zone without knowing whether they would have enough fuel at hand to continue the attack the next day. Because it could not support any more troops north of the Han River at this time, Eighth Army had been compelled to undertake the movement north of the 38 th Parallel with only one corps (I Corps), leaving IX Corps below the river. 21 Most troubling of all is that the redeployments and unit dispositions after Inchon were frequently at odds with the very objectives they were designed to accomplish. It is absolutely clear that the withdrawal of X Corps from the P'yongyang front and its deployment to Wonsan cost the UNC momentum, initiative, time, and induced an operational pause within the Eighth Army at just the moment when pursuit and exploitation were most ripe for execution. The simple fact of the matter seems to be that matters the functions of intelligence, logistics, and command and control, as well as fires were either ignored or subordinated to such a degree to matters of maneuver that they were rendered ineffective. Command and control lessons are ripe for the picking in this case study. General MacArthur employed an unorthodox command structure and adopted a series of controversial maneuvers that suggests he held some strongly preconceived notions regarding enemy options and the future course of the conduct of the war. 22 Most criticisms of the UNC command structure during the 1950 offensive focus on two areas. First is the divided command structure between Eighth Army and X Corps, and the other was what we today would call a poor command climate.
The reliance on an ad hoc corps headquarters that later became the X Corps to serve as General Headquarters Reserve, created friction and undermined unity of command and unity of effort. By keeping X Corps separate from Eighth Army in Korea, General MacArthur created a command structure that functioned in a cumbersome manner and caused some concern within both Eighth Army and X Corps as well as among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 23 These officers held to the Von Schlieffen view, "It is better to abandon a whole province than to divide an army." 24 Nonetheless, the divided command structure was justified in MacArthur's view, …terrain and logistical hardships warranted separate combat establishments. He claimed that the dual assault could be efficiently coordinated from Japan --the actual base for all Korean operations, even though it was seven hundred miles distant --without diminishing the combat power of either drive. MacArthur dismissed the risk of Chinese intervention, and was confident that the disintegrating North Korean Army posed no significant threat of counterattack to any prong of the advance. In Korea, operational intelligence failures were significant. They ranged from routine administrative reports that widely underestimated the effect of weather on the prosecution of operations, 27 to a tragic failure to appreciate the implications of a major UN (read US) presence on the Chinese border with North Korea leading to Chinese intervention.
UNC forces were ill served as they prepared to prosecute operations into North Korea. The higher intelligence elements allowed an inexplicable optimism to color their assessments of the course of the war. It would seem that from the weather to enemy actions they had preconceived notions of how the operation would unfold and were not prepared to receive and act on indications that pointed to a different pattern.
It is ironic that the tactical unit leaders up to and including Eighth Army all had a better appreciation of the risks that , 1967, page 10, 15 -17, and 21 . The three specific missions were the expulsion of NKPA forces and the restoration of international peace and security in the area (authorized by the third security council resolution during the initial phases of the crisis.) The next mission was the destruction of the NKPA forces in order to provide for the establishment of international peace and security in the area. This expansive step was broadly endorsed within the UN and in the diplomatic community publicly. The next mission was the UN authorized directive for holding elections and "the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea." 14. The reasons compelling the expansion of war aims are less a result of MacArthur's push for expansion than they are the product of the times in which the decisions regarding expansion were made. Internationally the expansion of Communism had caused an awakening in the free world that the threat had to be met. The state department was active in advocating a philosophy of containment and later including the roll back of the communist tide. Domestic politics created pressure in the executive and legislative branches that the election year cycle exacerbated. Allies in the United Nations were as active as the United States diplomats in recognizing both the threat and the opportunities associated with the remarkable turn around in the military situation in Korea. Finally there was little distinction between the types of communism, Tito's independent brand, the Soviet and Chinese were all viewed in the same manner --as an aggressive threat to free nations.
15. Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June -November 1950) Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, D.C. 1992, U.S. Government Printing Office pages page 612. Eighth Army accepted movement of forces to the eastern coast as operationally prudent, the issue was simply one of forces and timing. This is indicated clearly by the fact that General Walker discussed at least two alternative proposals to shift forces to the eastern coast. General MacArthur's counter in insisting on an amphibious movement, which was opposed by Eighth Army, Admiral Joy (Commander of Naval Forces Far East), and General O. P. Smith, was that the logistical challenges associated with supporting forces shifted overland were simply too great. General Walker's plan proposed supporting forces shifted east through the P'yongyang-Wonsan corridor by trucking supplies from the ports of Pusan and Inchon. Given the difficulty later demonstrated in sustaining Eighth Army alone via the same methods I believe that it is reasonable to question whether General Walker's proposals were logistically any better than General MacArthur's option. The deterioration of enemy resistance in southern Korea offered tempting opportunities for classic wartime exploitation. The allied forces were in excellent position to pursue the battered North Korean Army to its destruction. In MacArthur's view such a crushing move, if executed promptly while the opportunity existed, promised complete victory… and Secretary of Defense were reluctant to question his judgment because of his remarkably successful operations during the Inchon to Seoul push.
Further, the split command structure between Eighth Army and X Corps and the relationship of the respective commanders to General MacArthur created an environment where General MacArthur was not receiving the benefit of honest and candid input from his subordinate leadership. Walker was convinced he was going to be relieved from command during the November time frame because of his reluctance to proceed at the pace MacArthur expected. On the other hand, given his loyalty, his admiration for, and previously close working relationship for General MacArthur, General Almond was reluctant to suggest anything to General MacArthur that he felt General MacArthur did not wish to hear.
For more on the relationship between MacArthur and Almond the following is offered, General MacArthur elevated Almond to the command of X Corps for one simple reason: loyalty. … Almond exhibited the unswerving personal allegiance and tough resolve that could keep X Corps moving in conformity with MacArthur's dictates. The supreme commander wanted a loyal subordinate who would faithfully adhere to his guidance with unquestioning exactitude.
Intelligence estimates underestimated the effects of weather on operations to the extent that the Corps Operation Order declared "the period October -March is the most favorable for ground operations from the stand point of weather". This estimate of the situation ignored the shock effect of "Siberian winds and freezing temperatures" that plunged the mercury "far below zero". The absence of sufficient types and quantities of extreme cold weather clothing and unit equipment ensured that significant non-battle injuries would be incurred from exposure. Nevertheless, as the directives issued to the Far East Command indicate, the theater commander was warned to keep in mind the potential threat of the Chinese. Then, starting in August, Mao Tze-tung and Chau En-lai began a series of public declarations on a central theme: they would not 'supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors savagely invaded by imperialists.' … From late September on, the Chinese leaders, no doubt stirred by the Inchon landings, repeated and intensified their warnings. Beginning about 27 September on, even more threatening evidence of possible Chinese action was received by the U.S. … What seems quite factual is that the Chinese threats were real threats, and that our political and military leaders and the leaders of all our allies did not take them seriously. The pleas of the two neutrals, India and Yugoslavia, were thrust aside. 30. The lack of operational fires may be contested by some, especially advocates of air power. However, despite significant and important contributions of air delivered fires these fires were in essence tactical fires. For a sense of the nature of air power contributions during this operation see, Mathew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1967, pages 75 -76.
